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DIVIDING CITIZENS UNITED: THE CASE V.
THE CONTROVERSY
Laurence H. Tribe*
In the five years since Citizens United, 1 that notorious and
2
much-misunderstood Supreme Court decision has become more
than just a case: it has become a symbol, a rallying cry. For some,
it is an emblem of free speech values at their best. For others, it is
a symptom of a deep sickness in our body politic. But we should
not forget that it was a case first, with a plaintiff who wanted to
distribute a political movie and was told “no.”
As a case dealing with a particular controversy over a
proposed publication, I believe Citizens United was rightly
decided, for the reasons I discuss in Part I, even if it was resolved
in a way that was symptomatic of judicial overreach all too
common on the current Court. But as a symbol and a symptom,
Citizens United has broader significance reflected in the Court’s
eventual opinion. It represents a bizarrely cramped and naïve
vision of political corruption and improper influence in the
electoral process—one that has become characteristic of Roberts
Court campaign finance law. And, more broadly, it is part of a
trend in First Amendment law that is transforming that body of
doctrine into a charter of largely untrammeled libertarianism, in
which the regulation of virtually all forms of speech and all kinds
of speakers is treated with the same heavy dose of judicial
skepticism, with exceptions perversely calculated to expose
particularly vulnerable and valuable sorts of expression to
* Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard University, and Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. This essay’s origin lies in a symposium on the
intersection of First Amendment law and corporate law held at Harvard Law School on
November 7, 2014, and I am grateful to my friend and colleague John Coates for including
me in that symposium. Thanks also to my students Sam Barr, Elizabeth Bewley, Jonathan
Gould, Chris Havasy, Robert Niles, and Max Rosen for their excellent research assistance.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Blaming Citizens United alone for our campaign finance system is particularly
mistaken. As Joshua Matz and I recently wrote, Buckley v. Valeo “caused a deluge long
before Citizens United.” LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE 97
(2014). And Super PACs trace their origin, at least most immediately, to the D.C. Circuit’s
post-Citizens United decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC. See id. at 106.
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unconvincingly justified suppression. 3 It is those trends, rather
than the outcome of Citizens United as applied to the facts before
the Court, that need to be revisited.
Part II provides a first cut at rethinking campaign finance
law. This effort is informed by the recognition that there are few
if any easy answers in this field. The First Amendment requires
hard choices about seriously conflicting yet equally foundational
constitutional values: democracy, liberty, equality. Each one of
these values is contested; no single value or theory can or should
reign supreme. But, as I strive to show, the Supreme Court has
started to privilege—throughout First Amendment law—an
overly skeptical and distrustful understanding of democracy and
an excessively rigid and mechanical approach to liberty, leaving
4
equality increasingly out of the picture. I believe the Court would
do well to rethink that approach.
I. CITIZENS UNITED AS A CASE
The popular uproar over the outcome and aftermath of
Citizens United has disguised the complexity of the issues
presented in the case itself. Citizens United forced the Court to
determine whether and how Congress can exclude disfavored
speakers from the political marketplace altogether or severely
restrict their participation in the name of political equality and
electoral fairness. The strong language in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion about the necessity of categorical First Amendment
protections for political discourse and the danger to our
democracy of letting government officials decide who may and
may not participate in that discourse expresses legitimate
3. For examples of such exceptions, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. 1 (2010) (speech implicating national security concerns); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393 (2007) (speech by public school students); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (speech
involving prisoners); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (government employee
speech). See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 127–39.
4. In an earlier era, the Court took more seriously how various ways of reading the
First Amendment would differentially affect the wealthy and the economically
disadvantaged. Writing for a majority of the Court in 1943, for example, Justice Black
expressly took into account egalitarian concerns in writing that “[d]oor to door distribution
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.” Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 599–606 (1985) (discussing
Burger Court cases demonstrating “[t]he Court’s use of an approach that increasingly
allows it to ignore the distributional dimension of legal rights,” id. at 603). For an account
sympathetic to the idea that egalitarian norms should inform First Amendment analysis,
see, for example, OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996).
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constitutional concerns that too often get minimized in the
adverse reactions to Citizens United.
The basic facts of Citizens United are worth revisiting
because they are so often bypassed in the race to reach the more
momentous issues. The case arose as a challenge to a federal law
prohibiting “electioneering communications” backed by
corporate funds in the thirty days before a primary election. The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 prohibited
corporations and unions from funding such “electioneering
communications,” defined to include “‘any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days of a
5
primary . . . election.”
The putative “electioneering communication” at issue in the
case was a film, Hillary: The Movie, a highly critical 90-minute
documentary about Hillary Clinton, who was then a candidate in
the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. Citizens United, a
nonprofit corporation partially funded by for-profit corporations,
sought to promote Hillary: The Movie on TV and distribute it
through video-on-demand. Citizens United, fearing possible civil
and criminal penalties under the campaign finance law for
promoting the film, sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the
restriction
on
“electioneering
communications”
was
unconstitutional as applied to its case.
These facts alone should give campaign finance reformers
pause. A nonprofit corporation motivated by its openly
proclaimed conservative ideology wanted to distribute a political
documentary to willing, paying viewers—and it was being told it
could not do so because some of its money came from for-profit
corporations. Had the political shoe been on the other foot, many
of those crying “foul” might have had second thoughts. Yet the
constitutional rule obviously cannot depend on whether the
relevant litmus turns red or blue. In my view, the Court was
correct in holding that the government could not bar such a film
from airing—particularly at the very time when it would likely
6
have the greatest impact, just before an election. But the Court
did more than decide this as-applied challenge, instead reaching
5. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012)).
6. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating a state law making it a
crime for a newspaper editor to publish an editorial on election day urging voters to vote
a certain way).
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out to invalidate the statute on its face. As detailed below, such
Court-invited broadening of the issues initially presented by the
parties has become a trait characteristic of the Roberts Court.
A. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND SOME INADEQUATE
RESPONSES
When the Court first heard argument in Citizens United, it
became clear that in order to uphold the law’s application to
prevent Citizens United from distributing its film criticizing
Hillary Clinton, the Court would also have to conclude that the
very same organization could equally have been prevented from
distributing a magazine or book with precisely the same content,
at the same time, and with exactly the same financial backing. To
be sure, efforts have been made to distinguish the print media
from television on various (problematic) theories, focusing on
spectrum scarcity or the ostensibly public ownership of the
airwaves. But nobody supposes that books and films could
7
plausibly be put into different First Amendment silos. Yet the
8
nightmare image of bookburning—think Fahrenheit 451 —made
the book hypothetical lethal to the attempt by the government’s
attorney, Malcolm Stewart, to defend the Obama
Administration’s effort to prevent what Citizens United sought to
distribute. Justice Alito engineered a particularly devastating
exchange in which the government lawyer seemingly had no
choice but to concede that, under the Government’s theory,
Congress could even ban books about candidates for political
9
office if they were funded with corporate money. Chief Justice
Roberts followed up: “It’s a 500-page book, and at the end it says,
and so vote for X, the government could ban that?” The lawyer
10
replied that it could. Though it took an additional round of oral
11
argument and nearly a year for the Court to decide the case,
7. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988)
(noting “the tension between the Supreme Court’s radically divergent approaches to the
print and electronic media,” id. at 1005, and suggesting “a more candid equation between
the new media and the old,” id. at 1010).
8. See generally RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953).
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–28, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No.
08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
08-205.pdf.
10. Id. at 29.
11. In the second round of argument, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan was tasked
with defending the law’s application to the anti-Hillary film as well as its facial validity. See
Transcript of Oral Reargument at 29, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205%
5BReargued%5D.pdf. On reargument, Kagan noted that the FEC had never applied the
relevant legal provision to books, id. at 65, and tried to distinguish books from pamphlets
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Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court made clear that the
problem identified in the initial argument was very much on the
mind of the majority, presenting a parade of horribles that could
be permitted if the Court rejected Citizens United’s facial
challenge:
The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days
before the general election, that exhorts the public to
disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national
forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging
the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent
U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil
Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for
a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of
free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of
12
censorship.

In each of these examples, an ideologically motivated
nonprofit would be banned from participating in political
advocacy, the very kind of speech that the First Amendment is
meant to protect most vigorously. The risk of censoring print
advocacy—canonical communication in the marketplace of
political ideas—was too great, and the distinction between film
and print too ephemeral, to uphold the bar on “electioneering
communications” as applied to Citizens United’s publication.
Justice Stevens’ vision of a “reasonableness” standard does
little to provide a workable solution to this particularly
nettlesome First Amendment quagmire. Since his retirement,
13
Justice Stevens, who dissented vehemently in Citizens United
and has called the Court’s decision “a giant step in the wrong
direction,” has continued to advocate his position in a book, in the
14
media, and even before Congress. He has proposed what he
views as a simple solution to the campaign finance problem given
the Court’s evident unwillingness to revisit its precedent. His
solution would take the form of a constitutional amendment:
“Neither the First Amendment nor any provision of this
on the grounds that only the latter is “pretty classic electioneering,” id. at 66. Whether the
Solicitor General’s office would have done better to concede the invalidity of the law as
applied to Citizens United might warrant consideration, though not in this space.
12. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010).
13. See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong
Direction,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/
justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-wrong-direction.html; see also JOHN PAUL
STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION
(2014).
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Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the Congress or any
state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money
that candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend in
15
election campaigns.”
While Justice Stevens’s solution has the appearance of
simplicity—bracketing the political impossibility of its
16
endorsement by the supermajorities demanded in Article V —its
standard of “reasonableness” is bound to prove far too
indeterminate in application for a First Amendment standard,
where the notorious chilling effect of vague and nebulous criteria
has long led judges to steer clear of the mushy standards that
suffice for government work in such areas as the law of search and
seizure. Even Justice Stevens found his own proposed
amendment difficult to apply in a recent interview. The
interviewer “asked whether the amendment would allow the
government to prohibit newspapers from spending money to
publish editorials endorsing candidates. He stared at the text of
15. Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign
Finance Will Affect 2014 and Beyond: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Justice John Paul Stevens), available at
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeHearings&ContentRecord_
id=3fb0fbe5-f5f6-4366-80fa-ab84c40746ff&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d3556cc7152a7ed&Group_id=1983a2a8-4fc3-4062-a50e-7997351c154b.
16. Full disclosure: The amendment proposed by Justice Stevens resembles one I
drafted for Congressman Adam Schiff (D. Cal.), which he introduced in the 112th
Congress, before I had concluded that such an amendment had no chance of passage. That
amendment read: “Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to forbid Congress or
the States from imposing content-neutral limitations on private campaign contributions or
independent political campaign expenditures, or from enacting systems of public campaign
financing, including those designed to restrict the influence of private wealth by offsetting
campaign spending or independent expenditures with increased public funding.” H.R.J.
Res. 111, 112th Cong. (2012). This amendment, as the text makes clear, was aimed not just
at overturning Citizens United, but also the following year’s decision in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), which struck down a
state’s provision of “matching” funds for publicly funded candidates when their privately
funded opponents (and their opponents’ independent supporters) spent above a certain
amount. Even if an amendment—either Stevens’s or Schiff’s version—were politically
plausible, it would still raise difficult questions. An amendment would have to distinguish
between money spent producing ordinary films or books, on the one hand, presumably
including ordinary films or books with a distinct political tilt or even a discernible message
favorable to one or another candidate, and “independent political campaign
expenditures,” on the other. This line, as the initial Citizens United oral argument
demonstrated, is a dangerously thin and slippery one. Moreover, any amendment would
have to thread the difficult needle of simultaneously inviting closer judicial scrutiny of
incumbent-protective and otherwise self-serving limitations, while still giving Congress
and state legislatures broader latitude to enact limitations consistent with democratic
values. These difficulties should not foreclose the quest for a workable change to
constitutional doctrine, through an amendment or otherwise, but should underscore the
difficulty of revising the Court’s Citizens United holding and the wisdom of proceeding
incrementally in this field.
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his proposed amendment for a little while. ‘The “reasonable”
would apply there,’ he said, ‘or might well be construed to apply
17
there.’” This reasonableness standard requires the sort of “I
know it when I see it” ad-hockery that plagued the Court’s mid18
century attempts to define obscenity. And such an approach
lacks even the relatively more structured character of the kind of
proportionality analysis that the former Chief Justice of Israel,
Aharon Barak, has famously championed in his influential
writings, writings that have apparently had an impact on the
approach toward which Justice Breyer has gravitated in recent
19
years.
Various rhetorical strategies employed by Citizens United
opponents of late also fail to provide a doctrinally sustainable way
forward. If we take seriously (and share) the Court’s aversion to
anything that would permit book-banning—as we should—then
both the rallying cry of “money isn’t speech” and “corporations
aren’t people” are analytical non-starters. The argument that
money doesn’t amount to speech and thus may be regulated
without implicating the First Amendment carries little legal
weight. As Joshua Matz and I recently wrote, “[A]llowing
government to control who can spend enough to get heard on a
20
grander scale would render freedom of speech illusory.” For, as
Justice Kennedy made clear in his opinion in Citizens United, “All
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money
amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.
The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who
21
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.” The right to deliver a speech
or perform a song obviously includes the right to speak or sing for
a fee as well as the right to hire research assistants and pay for an
accompanying guitarist, and the right to publish a newspaper or
book certainly includes the right to spend money doing so and to
earn a profit in the bargain. Even Justice Stevens acknowledged
17. Liptak, supra note 14.
18. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 121.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–52 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that “Breyer’s Alvarez
opinion was classic Breyer,” and that consequently it was “surprising (and intriguing) that
Kagan joined it—and did so just one year after going along with Scalia’s entirely
incompatible opinion in Brown”).
20. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 112.
21. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (citing Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Many persons
can trace their funds to corporations, if not in the form of donations, then in the form of
dividends, interest, or salary.”)).
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in dissent that we live in “an age in which money and television
22
ads are the coin of the campaign realm.” And, more generally, it
seems pointless to argue that people have a right to engage in a
particular activity but not to spend money doing so or to do so in
return for monetary compensation.
Undoubtedly, the right to engage in a particular type of
conduct needn’t invariably entail the right to do so as part of an
economic transaction: the right to have consensual sex or to
become pregnant, for example, doesn’t inescapably imply the
right to sell one’s sexual services to others or to become a
surrogate mother for a price. It may well be, as Deborah Hellman
23
has forcefully argued, that substantive liberties protected by the
Constitution might usefully be divided into those that are
accompanied by a right to expend one’s own resources optimizing
the realization of the liberties at issue and those that are not: the
right to the assistance of counsel pretty obviously includes a right
to spend all one has available or can amass from supporters to
prove one’s innocence, while the right to vote, when
constitutionally protected, does not entail a right to purchase
24
votes. But recognizing that commodification changes the
constitutional equation hardly implies that the introduction of
money into the picture automatically obliterates the application
25
of otherwise governing constitutional principles.
The “corporations aren’t people” argument likewise fails to
overcome the First Amendment concerns raised by Citizens
United, and fails as well to address many of the concerns of those
who oppose the decision. Corporations, including those organized
for strictly business reasons, have long enjoyed at least some
constitutional protections; under the constitutional system we
currently enjoy, few would suggest that a State or the Federal
Government could censor speech expenditures by an entity whose
views it found anathema. This logic applies to for-profit
corporations, non-profit corporations, and unions. Laissez-faire
capitalism, happily, no longer dictates our constitutional destiny.
22. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
23. See Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953
(2011); Deborah Hellman, Presentation at Symposium on Advancing Democracy at
Harvard Law School (Nov. 7, 2014).
24. Even the right to vote itself “was mentioned in the Constitution only in a
backhanded way and was limited essentially to property-owning, taxpaying white males
over the age of twenty-one.” Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional
History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2003).
25. See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 253–81.
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Yet it would take a full-fledged constitutional revolution to strip
all First Amendment protections from entities organized in a
corporate form just because they exist only by virtue of a legal
26
structure.
Justice Thurgood Marshall has articulated an alternative
approach that may have more normative appeal, despite its recent
rejection by the Court. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, the Court upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance
Act, which prohibited corporations from using treasury money to
make independent election-related expenditures. Justice
Marshall argued that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent
27
expenditures.” Implicit in this statement is not only a vigorously
egalitarian approach to First Amendment law in the electoral
context—one that in principle I would tend to favor—but also an
approach that accompanies its egalitarian vision with a vision that
assumes the legitimacy of permitting those whom we elect to
govern our affairs to decide without judicial supervision which
distributions of political influence depart from properly
egalitarian criteria of power and which adhere to those criteria:
the theory of Austin was that unsupervised legislative majorities
should be entrusted to decide when allowing one person to speak
(or spend money) has “unfairly” influenced complex political
processes, whether by diluting or overwhelming the voices of
28
others or in some other way. Although this theory appears to
26. On the applicability of the First Amendment to corporations, see First Nat’l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780–86 (1978). Of course the mere applicability of the First
Amendment does not suggest that the Constitution forbids imposing conditions on
government-issued corporate charters to limit the ability of corporate managers to divert
to political or religious causes the money entrusted to them by those who purchase shares
not for the purpose of advocacy but strictly for the purpose of maximizing their income or
wealth. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and
Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012). To be sure,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands for the proposition that government may
not impose its will, without limit, on individuals or associations in exchange for government
benefits. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 253–81. Still, nothing in Buckley, Citizens
United, or standard First Amendment theory suggests that the state may not trade the
benefits of the corporate form for limits on the freedom of corporate managers to spend
other people’s money—including that of investors and shareholders—however they wish.
27. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (emphasis added).
28. For a normative theory of “complex equality,” arguing that inequalities in one
sphere (such as economic wellbeing) should not affect citizens’ standings in others (such
as political discourse), see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
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provide a powerful justification for restricting corporate
participation in the political process—or indeed for restricting
how much amassed wealth individuals may expend to affect the
workings of that process—it proved unable to overwhelm a
stronger recent strain in First Amendment jurisprudence. That
strain sets its face unalterably against permitting the state to
determine, as if it were the conductor of our democratic choir,
29
who may be permitted to speak, how much, and how loudly.
In any case, successfully challenging corporate personhood
could not address many of the concerns raised by Citizens United,
for at least two reasons. The first is that speech by non-natural
persons like corporations and unions is not entirely (or even
mostly) to blame for the recent spike in campaign spending by
sources other than the candidates themselves or the political
30
parties to which they belong: rather, superrich individuals are.
Indeed, large businesses—and for-profit corporations generally—
have a strong interest in not alienating large swaths of their
customers or clients with controversial forms of political
influence, such as donating directly to social and political causes
that some of those constituent groups may not support and might
indeed actively oppose (consider Target’s controversial 2010
31
donation to a group opposing same-sex marriage).
The second reason is that, even if corporations were not
regarded as “persons” within the meaning of various
constitutional provisions, and even if restrictions on monetary
outlays were not viewed as restrictions on the speech facilitated
by those outlays, that would imply relatively little about the
constitutional validity of particular restrictions on corporate
spending on, or contribution to, various political causes. For
individual citizens—persons, all—would still have a First
Amendment right to receive the information and ideas (whether
in the form of books, films, video displays, or digital distributions)
that corporate expenditures can bring into the marketplace of
information and ideas. Regardless of whether a particular source
29. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 98–99. Indeed, the fear of allowing the
government to function as conductor seems to have animated Justice Kennedy’s decision
in Town of Greece v. Galloway, in which he cautioned against “forc[ing] . . . legislatures . . .
to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech.” 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014).
30. See Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-hascitizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html; see also Michael S. Kang, The End of
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (2012) (describing corporate spending
after Citizens United).
31. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 111–12.
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of speech may claim federal constitutional protection for itself
under the First Amendment, censoring that speech may abridge
the “freedom of speech” that the First Amendment undoubtedly
protects vis-à-vis would-be recipients of the ideas and information
32
conveyed. Perhaps one of the strongest moves in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Citizens United was his pivot
from the rights of speakers to the rights of listeners—their rights
to hear and see whatever messages anyone or anything might
choose to spend money to send their way and to make up their
own minds about what to believe or to reject. “When Government
seeks to use its full power . . . to command where a person may
get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may
33
not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.” At an abstract
level, it’s difficult to disagree.
B. OPPORTUNISTIC OVERREACH
Thus, the Court’s decision was correct at least as applied to
Citizens United and the movie it wished to spend corporate funds
to disseminate. But five Justices used the case to create an
opportunity to go much further. From the initial briefing to the
final argument, the Court greatly expanded the scope of the issues
presented. And in its decision, the Court dodged a multitude of
34
paths to a narrower ruling.
The Court heard argument twice in Citizens United, and the
scope of the case widened dramatically between its two
appearances in the Marble Palace. The brief for Citizens United
the first time its case reached the Court presented a suitably
narrow question for review: “Whether the prohibition on
corporate electioneering communications in the Bipartisan

32. For example, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the first
Supreme Court decision striking down an Act of Congress on the basis of the Free Speech
Clause, did so on the basis of listeners’ rights, at the behest, indirectly, of foreign speakers
not themselves entitled to First Amendment protection. In addition, the First
Amendment’s Petition Clause embodies not only the rights of citizens to express their
views and address their grievances to government officials but also the structural principles
that those who govern should not be cut off from any source of critique or complaint. The
implications of that set of rights and principles for legislative lobbying in particular cannot
be ignored in assessing what it would mean to overturn Citizens United.
33. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
34. I do not go as far as some, in the academy and on the federal bench, in
propounding the general superiority of narrower holdings or judicial deference over
broader decisions. See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1996). I do, however, fault the Citizens United Court for its overreach in that case,
for the reasons set out in this section.
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) can constitutionally be
applied to a feature-length documentary film about a political
candidate funded almost exclusively through noncorporate
donations and made available to digital cable subscribers through
35
Video On Demand.” Indeed, fully cognizant of the thick body of
precedent disfavoring sweeping facial challenges in cases where
holding a law unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand
would suffice to give the challenger full relief, Citizens United had
expressly abandoned the facial challenge it had originally
launched in the district court. Despite the narrowness of the
question thus presented, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito were eager to decide the broad constitutional issues
potentially raised by the application of the federal statute at issue
to cases not before the Court. Justice Souter, meanwhile, stood
ready with a scathing dissent lambasting the majority for its
36
unwarranted activism. Chief Justice Roberts, worried as ever
about the potential damage to the Court’s credibility, engineered
a compromise and ordered reargument, without any opinions
37
being issued.
By the time the case was argued the second time, the Court
on its own motion had immensely expanded the question
presented for review: “For the proper disposition of this case,
should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce and the part of McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, which addresses the facial validity of Section
38
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002?” Justice
Stevens described this scope-creep scathingly in his dissent:
“Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature
of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves
39
an opportunity to change the law.” For a Court that had so often
explained the narrowness of its rulings by appealing to the
essentially passive nature of its jurisdiction, this was, for Justice
Stevens, a departure that begged for justification. Indeed, the
Court has often taken great pains to emphasize its perceived role
35. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08205).
36. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 92. For a discussion of the deliberations
between the Justices regarding Citizens United, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 165–69
(2012).
37. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 92.
38. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205) (citations omitted).
39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 398 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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as a resolver of ordinary cases and controversies brought to it by
litigants. On this view, the Court opines on the constitutional
validity of contested exercises of power only to the degree
required to resolve those cases, rather than serving as a roving
constitutional tribunal rendering advisory opinions on the validity
40
of laws. In Citizens United, the Court stepped enthusiastically
but without a word of explanation into a broader role.
Despite the Court-driven widening of the issues in the case,
there remained several more limited rulings that the Court
declined to adopt in its manifest rush to overrule Austin and to
make sweeping declarations about the role of money in politics
and about the sort of “corruption” whose avoidance might justify
restricting supposedly independent expenditures of money in
political campaigns.
In dissent, Justice Stevens offered three potentially narrower
grounds for decision: “First, the Court could have ruled, on
statutory grounds, that a feature-length film distributed through
video-on-demand does not qualify as an ‘electioneering
41
communication’ under §203 of BCRA.” Although that kind of
ruling might have served the objective of separating the
application of the statute to the case at hand from the swath of
applications implicated by the facial challenge the Court had
deputized itself to address, it remains unclear just how that
narrowing of the statute’s scope could have been reconciled either
with the statute’s language or with its legislative history. Nor is it
clear just how the Court would have explained distinguishing
feature-length films from brief docudramas or, for that matter,
from 90-second (or even shorter) television ads. Perhaps a strong
dose of the maxim of constitutional avoidance would have done
42
the trick for the time being.
40. The prohibition on advisory opinions is foundational. See Felix Frankfurter, A
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (1924) (“[A]dvisory opinions
are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere. The impact of actuality and the intensities of
immediacy are wanting.”). This more modest vision of the judicial role was famously
identified with the “passive virtues.” See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (setting out his theory).
But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (critiquing
Bickel).
41. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42. For a discussion of the canon of constitutional avoidance and its many different
forms, see, for example, Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71;
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000). For a discussion of the Roberts Court’s
uneasy relationship with the constitutional avoidance canon, see generally Richard L.
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Second, the Court could have read the statute to exempt
“nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from
43
for-profit corporations.” That, too, would have required the art
of statutory interpretation to execute some heroic acrobatics, but
the Roberts Court has not shrunk from such contortions in other
contexts—as in its 2012 reading of the Affordable Care Act’s
individual purchase “mandate” as not a mandate at all but a mere
44
tax incentive; or in its suggestion, in the Hobby Lobby case, that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s definition of the
“persons” entitled to religious accommodation might somehow
45
be confined to closely held Subchapter S corporations; or in its
decision in the Bond case to avoid opining on the scope of the
treaty power by simply refusing to apply the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act to an “unremarkable local
46
offense.” Finally, the Court might have ruled, after all, only on
Citizens United’s as-applied challenge, despite having sua sponte
broadened the question presented so as to encompass the facial
47
validity of the law at issue.
The Court’s decision instead to issue a sweeping facial ruling
in Citizens United—a ruling vastly broader than the question
posed by the case itself as the parties had chosen to litigate it—is
but one example in a growing trend of opportunistic overreach by
the Roberts Court. Chief Justice Roberts publicly claims a
restrained role for the institution, having famously declared that
the job of the Court is only to “call balls and strikes” rather than
48
to “pitch or bat.” The past decade tells a different story,
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 181.
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
44. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–95 (2012); TRIBE &
MATZ, supra note 2, at 63–64. In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts first made clear that the
mandate did not pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause and/or the
Necessary and Proper Clause before ultimately upholding it as a valid exercise of the taxing
power. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 62-63. These initial constitutional proclamations
might be understood as gratuitous, but they might also be framed as the Chief’s sole
justification for the statutory stretch the latter holding entailed.
45. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–75 (2014) (discussing
whether closely held corporations are “persons” under RFRA).
46. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). As many of my colleagues
have noted, the statute in Bond was hardly ambiguous, and thus stands as one of the more
notable recent instances of statute-stretching. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the
Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 89 (2014).
47. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
48. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.

DIVIDING CITIZENS UNITED_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE CASE V. THE CONTROVERSY

6/26/2015 3:26 PM

477

however—one of active vice rather than passive virtue. 49 The
overreach of Citizens United is but one example of the Court
resolving issues that are neither logically nor procedurally
necessary to a full disposition of the case at hand. In Citizens
United, the Court was presented with a narrow question about the
constitutionality of campaign finance rules as applied to a
nonprofit’s on-demand video, but it transformed the case into an
opportunity to rule with a broad brush, putting essentially all
50
future regulation of campaign finance in conspicuous jeopardy.
The Court followed a nearly identical pattern in Kiobel v. Royal
51
Dutch Petroleum Co., a case about the meaning of the Alien Tort
Statute, among our nation’s earliest and most cryptic statutes. In
Kiobel, the Court initially heard oral arguments on a relatively
narrow question, ordered reargument on a considerably broader
question, and then decided the case on the broader grounds. The
parallel between this procedural history and that of Citizens
United is striking. And in a wide range of other cases, on issues as
diverse as the constitutionality of Obamacare, labor law, and class
action law, the majority (usually consisting of the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) has been
criticized—often by other Justices—for issuing broader-than52
necessary opinions.
***
56 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf.
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50. A possible defense of this move might be that there is no coherent way, consistent
with the Court’s judicial rather than legislative role, for it essentially to redraft the statute
at issue by drawing lines that would—as neatly as would be required in the First
Amendment arena—sever the universe of applications that the Court could invalidate
from the residue of applications that the Court could leave intact. Absent the formal ability
to remand the case to Congress for modification of the statute, the Court may have viewed
its hands as being tied.
51. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 n.12 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(noting that she “see[s] no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not
outcome determinative,” given that five Justices would uphold the individual mandate on
Taxing Power grounds); Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I concur only in the judgment, however, because I cannot
agree with the majority’s decision to address unnecessarily significant constitutional issues
well outside the scope of the questions presented and briefing. By doing so, the majority
breaks our own rules and, more importantly, disregards principles of judicial restraint that
define the Court’s proper role in our system of separated powers.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561–62 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing, in a class action case, that the Court should have remanded the case for
further proceedings under a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than
“disqualif[ying] the class at the starting gate,” id. at 2562).
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This analysis tells a very different story about Citizens United
than the one the public typically hears. I believe that McCainFeingold was indeed unconstitutional as applied to the facts of
Citizens United. But the decision nonetheless represents a
worrisome trend by the Court: reaching out to decide issues not
squarely before it. In Citizens United, that move led the Court first
to formally broaden the questions presented, then to issue a facial
rather than as-applied ruling. Both were mistakes. Yet judicial
overreach is far from the only thing wrong with Citizens United.
The case also represents the Roberts Court’s overly narrow view
of the values that should animate First Amendment
jurisprudence. In the next section, I take up that issue.
II. RECONSTRUCTING CAMPAIGN FINANCE THEORY
AND DOCTRINE
The public discourse surrounding Citizens United makes
clear that the case is about far more than its precise holding and
the analysis underlying that holding: it is about the kind of
democracy our Constitution should be understood to create and
the types of governing arrangements it should be understood to
put in place. This section looks beyond Citizens United itself to
First Amendment jurisprudence more generally and reframes the
normative questions at stake in that area of law, rather than
proffering particular doctrinal reforms.
Citizens United highlights a fundamental tension between
two conceptions of democracy—a tension with which neither the
majority nor the dissent, nor the partisans on either side, fully
reckons. At one pole lies the egalitarianism that has long been a
central strand of our democratic tradition. The social contract
tradition of Hobbes and Locke, from which the founders drew
many of their ideas, incorporates an ideal of equality: the social
contract (be it real, tacit, or hypothetical) is one between all
individuals, each of whom is on equal footing in entering into
53
society. The framers repeatedly affirmed a commitment to civic
53. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 120–21 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–33
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1967) (1690). Although both Hobbes and
Locke considered women to be persons for the purposes of the creation of the social
contract, their views on women in the private sphere did not, of course, approach the
modern idea of equality between the sexes. For in-depth discussions regarding the role of
women in the political and social philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, see FEMINIST
INTERPRETATIONS OF THOMAS HOBBES (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Joanne H. Wright eds.,
2012); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Kirstie M.
McClure eds., 2007).
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equality in the construction of a representative system, a
commitment exemplified by James Madison’s Federalist 57:
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not
the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
54
States.

In the same era, the Constitution and Bill of Rights
incorporated principles of civic equality. We need recall but two
examples long predating Reconstruction and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: the Constitution bars the
55
United States from granting titles of nobility, and the First
Amendment prevents government from privileging any religion
56
or its members over other religions or over nonbelievers.
(Although notions of “civic equality” long excluded some groups,
most notably women and racial minorities, those notions are
conceptually compatible with—and perhaps even demand—the
more inclusive polity that we have only belatedly begun to
achieve.)
In the modern era, these ideals of civic equality were clearly
and powerfully embodied in the Supreme Court’s
reapportionment cases. Several decisions in the early 1960s, most
57
58
notably Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, required that
legislative districts (both state and federal) be equal in population.
Embedded in these cases was a theory of equal representation,
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This
being said, the framers had a notoriously limited and inherently unequal conception of
political equality. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“When the Founding Fathers used this
phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. ‘We the
People’ included, in the words of the framers, ‘the whole Number of free Persons.’ On a
matter so basic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, although
they were counted for representational purposes—at three-fifths each. Women did not
gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years.” (internal citations omitted)).
For my reflections on this issue, see Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the
Constitution or to Bury It?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing that “the Constitution
of Thurgood Marshall is . . . incomplete” and that “[t]o disparage the work of 1787 is to
overlook those institutional structures that made it possible for the Supreme Court of the
United States, from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, after a century of national blindness, both to
see, and to make the country face, what had to be done to redeem the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment’s promise”).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
56. Id. amend. I.
57. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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now famously expressed by the slogan “one person, one vote”: the
Constitution, with the conspicuous exception of the composition
of the United States Senate, requires that all citizens have an
equal voice—at least when it comes to voting in legislative
elections. This reapportionment revolution mattered not only in
theory, but in practice: political scientists have documented the
many ways in which it affected concrete policy outcomes, noting
the “singular conclusion” that “[t]he equalization of
representation led directly to an equalization of the distribution
59
of public expenditures—who got what.” Civic equality, in other
words, is directly related to policy results.
Despite the strength of this egalitarian tradition, it is
threatened by a competing, non-egalitarian tradition that results
from the intersection between our political and economic systems.
Capitalism has resulted in different interest groups having
60
differing quantities of resources, which those groups deploy in
the public sphere in pursuit of their preferred policy outcomes—
with some citizens being far more able to influence policy than
others. It was, of course, this inequality that George Orwell
famously parodied in Animal Farm, with its unforgettable
proclamation that “all animals are equal, but some are more equal
61
than others.”
This unequal distribution of potential influence operates
through a variety of mechanisms: the increasing cost of
campaigns, compelling candidates to spend more time fundraising
and leading them to avoid embracing policy positions that would
antagonize their potential sources of campaign funding; the
maturation of the lobbying industry as a major force in
Washington and nearly every state capital; and, most recently, the
rise of supposedly “independent” campaign expenditures as a new
means for powerful interests to affect electoral outcomes and,
whatever the outcomes, to win preferential access and wield
disproportionate influence. While some scholars, often called
62
“pluralists,” have lauded these changes as simply expanded
59. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 15
(2008).
60. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 336–76
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013); David Singh Grewal, The
Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 632–44 (2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 2014) (2013)).
61. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
62. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).
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means of civic participation, it was over a half century ago that
E.E. Schattschneider first noted that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class
63
accent.” More recently, political scientists have made a powerful
empirical case that American government is systematically far
more responsive to the interests of the wealthy and well64
organized than to the interests of ordinary citizens.
The fact that government is more responsive to the
preferences, priorities and interests of some citizens than others is
perhaps endemic to any attempt to run an egalitarian polity
alongside a non-egalitarian economy. But the phenomenon is
particularly worrisome in the era of what many have called a
“great divergence.” In what is now a well-known story, over the
past four decades America has witnessed ever-growing (and too
often racially skewed) gaps between rich and poor: in income,
wealth, health, educational outcomes, and even in family
65
stability. As the lived experiences of the wealthy and the poor
diverge, it becomes increasingly significant that the political
system is more responsive—and is widely understood to be more
responsive—to the preferences of one group than to those of the
other. The Citizens United dissenters rightly highlight these
inequalities in political access and power, while the majority
largely overlooks them and incants bromides about how a key
precept of our First Amendment tradition is that government may
not address such inequalities through seeking to “level the playing
field” of political speech.
To be sure, those bromides reflect important truths about the
dangers of governmental efforts to decide what a “level playing
field” in the world of ideas and information would look like. But
those are not the only important truths to be considered. The
fundamental dynamic—a dynamic in which the non-egalitarian
character of America’s economic system undermines the
egalitarianism of our core political ideals—is complicated by three
dichotomies that run through campaign finance law.
63.
64.

E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH
RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA, & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2012).
65. See, e.g., TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING
INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012).
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The first is the divide between what might be called
66
“trusting” and “skeptical” views of democracy. Recognizing that
this is a huge oversimplification, one can sum up the contrast this
way: on the more trusting view, the greatest threat to democracy
comes from outside influences (especially moneyed influences),
and courts should by and large trust the political branches to
protect the political system against those harms. The more
skeptical view, by contrast, focuses on the threat from within and
is wary of letting the political branches regulate without
significant judicial supervision the processes by which they are
elected, with a particular fear that legislatures will enact
incumbent-protection provisions at the expense of a robust, selfcorrecting democracy. On this more skeptical view, a primary role
of the independent judiciary is to regulate the political process
when the elected branches cannot be trusted to do so
disinterestedly. It is a view that fits firmly into the political process
tradition. It can plausibly claim to be a descendant of the Warren
67
Court reapportionment cases. The Roberts Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence, building on decisions going back to the
68
mid-1970s, has at times adopted this distinctly skeptical
approach, perhaps summed up best by the Chief Justice’s blunt
statement in 2014 that “those who govern should be the last
69
people to help decide who should govern.”
While concerns about such self-serving distortions in the
70
electoral process certainly have merit in some contexts, those
66. Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528 (2014)
(reviewing ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2014)) (comparing Robert Post’s trusting view of democracy with
Winston Churchill’s skeptical view of democracy).
67. The canonical sources on political process theory are United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980).
68. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
69. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014). This view is not new,
however; as early as Buckley v. Valeo, the Court’s first modern campaign finance decision,
the Court noted that “equalization of permissible campaign expenditures might serve not
to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who lacked
substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.”
424 U.S. at 56–57. This, however, does little to explain the Court’s divergent approaches
to incumbent protection in the campaign finance context and the redistricting context. See
Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004).
70. Notably, they do not have merit in every context: where regulations are passed
by popular initiative, it is far from clear how any presumption of self-serving distortion is
warranted. See infra note 78 (discussing Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)).
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concerns should not be permitted to eclipse other, equally serious
if not more pervasive, sources of worry. I have in mind particularly
the worry about what some label “corruption,” not in the narrow,
quid-pro-quo sense of outright bribery—“I give you my money, I
get your vote in favor of this or that measure that helps me and
my friends”—but in a general, more diffuse sense. In particular,
corruption can be understood in the broader sense of systemic
corrosion, exemplified by purchasing the gratitude, if not the
ongoing dependence, of the political officials whom one assists
financially in their quest for office and power.
The Citizens United Court took the narrowest possible view
of corruption, maintaining that the only legitimate government
interest in this field is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption.
But, as many have argued in response, quid pro quo corruption is
far too narrow a governmental interest to identify as
71
constitutionally relevant. It is an interest that does not begin to
reflect the full stakes at issue in the campaign finance realm: the
health of American democracy itself. Unless the notion of
interests sufficiently compelling to count in the First Amendment
calculus is strangely truncated to exclude interests this
fundamental simply because they appear imprecise or diffuse,
courts must recognize a compelling interest in combating
corruption broadly defined as a distortion in the political process,
understood to include a deviation from the ideal of equal
representation embodied in Federalist 57 and the
72
reapportionment cases. In a republican system of government—
a system that Article IV commands the United States to
guarantee—it is a legitimate and indeed compelling goal of
legislation, both state and federal, to ensure that officeholders and
their staff have no greater incentive to meet with, to respond
favorably to the approaches of, or to be susceptible to influence
by, those who either have supported their candidacies financially
or can be expected to do so in the future. This foundational ideal
may be unattainable in practice, so long as we have private
71. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); ROBERT C. POST,
CITIZENS DIVIDED (2014); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 341 (2009). For an argument that the Supreme Court should be reluctant to even
define corruption, see Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing
Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013).
72. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 71 (advocating reforms to combat “dependence
corruption,” which leads to policy distortion); Teachout, supra note 71, at 410–11 (arguing
“not . . . that corruption is a compelling state interest that might, in some cases, justify
restrictions on speech, but that there are two competing, equally important constitutional
interests at stake: free speech and the anti-corruption principle”).
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financing of political campaigns, but various policy decisions can
73
move us either closer to or further away from it. Moreover,
judicial supervision can help ensure that legislatures do not enact
incumbent-protection measures to entrench themselves at the
expense of the openness of the system. The Court’s master rule in
this area should fall under the overarching rubric of judicial
supervision to prevent all failures of representation, whether they
are brought about by actors inside or outside the political
74
branches.
The Court in Citizens United at places seems to acknowledge
both the empirical reality and the public belief that those who
provide the most financial assistance gain the most access and thus
75
the most influence —but, in what amounts to the most
paradoxical about-face in the decision, the Court elsewhere flatly
denies both that truth and the widespread perception of that
76
truth. It is unclear whether the Court is simply contradicting
itself or is saying that, genuine as this worry might be and however
much it might erode the foundations of the ideal of oneperson/one-vote, it simply cannot justify government-imposed
restrictions on speech. Insofar as the Justices in the Citizens
United majority are concerned with inequality and with this
broader sort of corruption—and I do not purport to know their
views on this matter beyond the words on the page—it is certainly
true that they are less concerned with those issues than with
preserving the laissez-faire ideal that individuals or groups may
spend their own money (and, evidently, the money entrusted to
them by investors) to help some people get elected and others get
defeated, and, in turn, to help some policies get chosen and others
get rejected.
Yet why the free speech ideal would have to be fatally
corrupted by suitable attention to this broader worry about
corruption remains for the reader to imagine; the Court largely
73. For a more detailed discussion of the issue, see TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at
104. To the degree that First Amendment jurisprudence does require that content-focused
restrictions on speech be reasonably effective, the doctrine would of course need to be
revisited if anything short of an across-the-board restriction on private spending in the
political arena were to survive efficacy review.
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“If elected officials
succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their
best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern.”).
76. See id. at 360 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause
the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is
political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.”).
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assumes its conclusion, in a worrisome substitution of ipse dixits
for legal reasoning. It fails to make a coherent argument to show
that it would be infeasible to carve a more sensitive middle path
between the seemingly naïve willingness of the Citizens United
dissenters (and of leading critics of Citizens United like Robert
77
Post ) to trust those in positions of political power to enact
campaign finance reforms that protect democracy more than they
preserve incumbency, and the seemingly boundless skepticism of
78
the Roberts Court majority in its campaign finance cases. I favor
such a middle path, which calls on judges to be skeptical of
campaign finance reforms that seem calculated to entrench or
empower incumbents, but more trusting when reforms prevent
corruption and there is little or no evidence that they have undue
pro-incumbent purposes or effects. This path is admittedly a
treacherous one to blaze, as it requires deep judicial engagement
with hard empirical questions: most notably, the tasks of
measuring the incumbency advantage, levels of corruption, and
incentives created by various funding schemes, and of assessing
the degree to which those schemes were in fact designed with
those effects in mind. But the difficulty of pursuing this course
should not foreclose judicial attempts to distinguish among
different types of campaign finance regulations: even if the Court
were to misjudge some regulations and consequently proved
77. For a recent statement of Dean Post’s views, see POST, supra note 71.
78. For examples of the Roberts Court striking down state or federal campaign
finance regulations, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down federal
aggregate limits on individual donations); Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490
(2012) (striking down Montana’s ban on corporate independent political expenditures in
state elections); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011) (striking down Arizona’s matching funds provision); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724
(2008) (striking the federal “Millionaire’s Amendment”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449 (2007) (striking down a federal restriction on so-called “issue advertising” by
third parties); and Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s
contribution limit as unconstitutionally low). The Roberts Court’s skeptical presumption
of corrupt self-dealing in the passage of campaign finance reforms is particularly difficult
to defend in the context of regulations, like that at issue in Bennett, enacted by popular
initiative. 131 S. Ct. at 2813. In any case, this heightened sensitivity to the corruption of
self-dealing incumbents is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s near-total insensitivity to
non-quid pro quo corruption. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The Court may
have been particularly skeptical of the Bennett matching funds scheme because it provided
publicly financed candidates with compensatory funding taking into account not only the
opposing privately financed candidate’s own spending, but also the spending of the
opponent’s independent supporters. 131 S. Ct. at 2813. Acting on its (doubtful) assumptions
that independent groups are truly independent and that their expenditures are unlikely to
be helpful to the candidates they support, the majority highlighted the “disparity in
control” that the scheme involved: the publicly financed candidate would have full control
over the public matching funds, while the privately financed candidate would be, in a sense,
penalized for the expenditures of groups outside his or her control. Id. at 2819.
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either too skeptical or too trusting in some cases, it would almost
certainly do better than it has done under its current approach of
essentially blanket skepticism.
The second dichotomy is between doctrinaire libertarianism
and less purely libertarian approaches to campaign finance—and
to speech generally. A purely libertarian approach to campaign
finance, much like a libertarian approach to economic regulation,
essentially assumes that there exists such a thing as a neutral
baseline, an “unregulated” marketplace of speech, of free and fair
elections, and of human interactions generally. The huge
shortcoming of this view, familiar to nearly everyone since the
early twentieth century if not before, is that the political system
(and the system of laws constructed by politics) does not preexist
the state and is not a product of “nature” but, rather, is constituted
79
by an elaborate system of man-made rules. The realist critique
of economic libertarianism dating to the early 1900s sheds light on
a fundamental weakness of an essentially laissez-faire approach in
the campaign finance realm. Economic libertarianism was
undermined by the growing recognition (or, for those who still
view the issue as contestable, the growing belief) that not only the
rules of corporate formation and limited corporate liability but
also the even more basic rules of property, contract, and tort were
80
all products not of a “brooding omnipresence in the sky” but of
81
positive law. Needless to say, the entire edifice of elections and
campaigns is itself the product of rules established by law, both
federal and state. Not to make too fine a point of it, most of the
means through which election-related speech is transmitted to the
public (including, obviously, the postal service and the airwaves,
both radio and television) are creations of the state as well. Given
that the legal rules construct the campaign and electoral system in
the first instance, it should not come as a surprise that the search
for something to hang onto as a “neutral, regulation-free”
baseline departures from which are deemed constitutionally
suspect is a search for something that just isn’t there. The question
in constructing a system of campaign finance, therefore, should
not be: What business has government interfering in the
unregulated operations of a supposedly “natural” and politically
79. For a small sampling of the vast literature on these issues, see, for example,
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 567–86; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Tribe, supra note 4.
80. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 238–45 (1985).
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unmediated marketplace of information and ideas? Rather, the
question should be: Given that the whole edifice is constructed by
political choices, which set of choices will best accommodate the
conflicting values that our constitutional framework, prominently
including the First Amendment, should be understood to
embody?
The Roberts Court seems to have answered this question by
excising not just egalitarianism but realism from the First
Amendment, at least in the campaign finance realm. In Arizona
82
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, for
example, the Court took to a new extreme the long-established
principle that “equalizing” or “leveling” citizens’ ability to
83
influence politics is categorically forbidden. Bennett involved a
state program in which publicly financed candidates were offered
“matching” public funds if their privately financed opponents
(and the opponents’ independent supporters) spent more than a
certain amount. The Court saw this offset provision as
unconstitutionally penalizing the privately financed candidate’s
right to spend his own money without limit. Thus, the Court now
forbids not just straightforward restrictions on politicians’ ability
to raise and spend money, but also public financing schemes that,
on the margins, might discourage the raising and spending of
additional amounts of money by providing public funds to one’s
opponents to partially offset such financial exertions.
Of course, the logic of Bennett could be somewhat arbitrarily
limited to schemes that involve matching-fund triggers of the sort
that Arizona had enacted. And yet, its logic could just as easily be
extended. Bennett suggests the Court is wary not just of “leveling
down” but also of “leveling up.” The fact that the privately
financed candidates remained free to spend to their hearts’
content did not save the law. The Court was concerned not simply
with their liberty to spend, but with their liberty to spend more
than their publicly funded opponents are permitted to spend with
the aid of the public fisc. Thus, Bennett implied a sharp distinction
between private funds earned in the private economy (sacrosanct,
democratic) and public funds delivered by the state (suspect,
distortive). The Court not only rejected the notion that egalitarian
values might be latent in the First Amendment or in the structure
of our Constitution, but also adopted the libertarian notion of a
82. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
83. Id. at 2825–26; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). But see supra note 78
for a possible narrower understanding of the concerns underlying Bennett.
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pre-regulatory “natural” distribution of political speech that can
only be warped by governmental interference.
The third and final distinction is that between fully theorized
views and what could be described as “incompletely theorized”
84
approaches. A purely libertarian approach to campaign finance
is an example of a “fully theorized” approach—with a normative
foundation and clear implications for policy that stem from that
normative foundation. As an alternative to this fully theorized
approach, there are two options. First, it could be replaced by a
different but no less fully theorized approach. Possible examples
from democratic theory include deliberative democracy and
communitarianism. Deliberative democracy, as the name
suggests, focuses on creating processes through which members of
85
the polity reason together about the public good.
Communitarian views often define liberty less in negative than in
positive terms—less in terms of the absence of governmentimposed restraints than in terms of active participation in selfgovernment, with particular focus on situating the individual in
86
the context of the larger polity. Both kinds of theory contrast
starkly with purely “aggregative” or “pluralist” views of
democracy, in which the only legitimate purpose of the political
process is to aggregate citizens’ pre-existing preferences.
Although they differ in substantial ways, both deliberative and
civic republican theories treat democracy as more than mere
aggregation, but rather as a forum for developing a shared
conception of the common good and then approximating it in
reality.
Rather than choosing one of these fully theorized
approaches, however—something that a multimember Court, not
to mention a vast and diverse society, cannot be expected to do—
one might simply aim to achieve what have been called
“incompletely theorized” agreements on particular important
84. For a detailed discussion and support of “incompletely theorized agreements,”
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733 (1995).
85. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996). For an application of deliberative-democratic theory to the
problem of for-profit corporations participating in politics, see Samuel J. Barr,
Deliberative Democracy and Corporate Political Advertising (Mar. 2011) (unpublished
A.B. honors thesis, Harvard College) (on file with Harvard University Library).
86. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982);
cf. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Federalism as the Architecture of Liberty: A
Comment on Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence (Mar. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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issues. 87 On the view this relatively modest aspiration suggests, we
need not agree upon any one fully theorized view of democracy
in order to draw on a range of theories and identify their areas of
intersection and points of tangency to demonstrate the
shortcomings of the purely libertarian view. Despite the appeal of
choosing one theory of democracy and building a system of legal
rules accordingly, we might as well recognize the truth that judges
are not, and should not aspire to become, philosopher-kings. They
need not—and, for both theoretical and institutional reasons,
should not—endorse and implement a single theory of
democracy. Instead, they should draw from all the legitimate
intellectual traditions available to them, to form what John Rawls
described as an “overlapping consensus,” in which different
normative conceptions of justice, even if not wholly consistent,
can together form a common if not necessarily permanent
88
foundation for political institutions.
These seemingly theoretical considerations should not be
regarded as beside the point for purposes of workaday
jurisprudence. They make a huge practical difference. In
particular, the theoretical framework that we adopt in the
campaign finance context directly implicates First Amendment
doctrinal analysis. To give but one example, traditional First
Amendment analysis typically requires that courts answer the
question of which proffered government interests are
“legitimate” or “compelling.” But that question cannot be
answered in a theoretical vacuum: doing so requires at least a
provisional theory of democracy. A minimally theorized
agreement on basic principles may be sufficient, but at least some
conceptual work needs to be done. The Justices simply cannot
avoid acting as democratic theorists in adjudicating campaign
finance cases under the First Amendment. For the First
Amendment, like much of the constitutional text, is a broadly
worded statement without a clear and uncontested meaning. It is
the Supreme Court’s job, in conversation with its predecessors
and with its contemporaries throughout society, to develop the
constitutional common law that gives the First Amendment’s text
89
a more determinate meaning. The quest for a mode of
87. See Sunstein, supra note 84.
88. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987); see also Justice David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th
Commencement Address, 124 HARV. L. REV. 429, 433 (2010) (“The explicit terms of the
Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of approved values, and the explicit
terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict when it arises.”).
89. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 51 (2010).
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interpretation that provides perfect clarity to the First
Amendment is chimerical. Courts must act as democratic
theorists, whether they wish to or not. Even if this is a second-best
reality that is not ideal in a democratic society, it is nonetheless
our reality, and it is almost certainly preferable to the imaginable
alternatives. And, given the inevitability of democratic theory, the
Court should favor minimally theorized agreements, ones that
seek to synthesize competing conceptions of democracy, rather
than the single-minded libertarianism that we have seen in
campaign finance cases in recent years.
The Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida
90
Bar may represent a promising exception to this single-minded
trend. There the Court, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the
bare majority, upheld Florida’s ban on personal solicitation of
campaign funds by judicial candidates. While this decision may
simply reflect an ad hoc judiciary-only exception to the Court’s
91
libertarian streak, its premises seem hard to square with Citizens
United’s unwillingness to treat public concern about the
dependence of officeholders on those who fund their elections as
a compelling reason to restrict campaign-related speech. Though
Chief Justice Roberts may believe that it’s more important for the
constitutional system that people trust judges to be apolitical
92
umpires than that they have confidence in the fairness and
openness of the political process, such a distinction seems
untenable and will hopefully, in time, be corrected.
***
Given this theoretical backdrop, how should the Court
ideally go about adjudicating campaign finance cases? As a matter
of prediction, only a substantially reconstituted Court would
pursue a path different from the one the Roberts Court appears
determined to follow—a path toward essentially invalidating all
substantial constraints on campaign spending and campaign
contribution. I have elsewhere argued that pursuing a
constitutional amendment to reform this area of the law is almost
93
certainly a lost cause. I do not intend to examine here the
90. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
91. See id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment is not abridged for
the benefit of the Brotherhood of the Robe.”); cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995) (treating public perceptions of the legal profession as important enough to
warrant content-based and even lopsided restrictions on speech by attorneys to accident
victims).
92. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 16.
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prospects for reform in terms of beating the rich at their own game
the way my colleague Larry Lessig hopes to do with his Mayday
94
Pac —other than to say that, even if such efforts were,
implausibly, to result in the election of people committed to
“doing the right thing” once in office, that would beg the question
of what “the right thing” would be: asking officeholders to pledge
that they will listen only to those whom they are constitutionally
elected to represent would leave unanswered huge questions
about whether the “right” theory of democracy requires elected
officials to disregard the views of those outside their immediate
constituency, and to disregard as well the intensity of various
groups’ convictions about what policies those officials should
pursue, as measured by the willingness of those groups to put their
money where their mouths are. So let me confine my discussion
to the more modest question: What should the Court have done
in Citizens United, once it made the dubious choice of answering
a question that the parties had not asked, the (hard) question of
McCain-Feingold’s facial validity as opposed to the (easy)
question of its validity as applied to the Hillary film?
Reconstructing McCain-Feingold, saving its valid
applications while striking down its invalid ones, would have been
tempting but extremely difficult in Citizens United. It would have
at the very least required judicially drawing lines that Congress
had chosen not to draw in drafting the law, lines presumably
distinguishing ordinary, for-profit business corporations from
overtly ideological, nonprofits like Citizens United itself. And, in
the course of that architectural and essentially legislative
undertaking, that reconstruction would have required revisiting
doctrines about just how constitutionally suspect speaker-based
lines are and what it would take to make such lines survive the
appropriate level or form of First Amendment scrutiny.
However the Court proceeded, it should probably have been
less preoccupied with pure listener-protection and with the
protection of “speech” without regard to speaker structure or
identity. Yes, listeners do and should matter greatly in First
Amendment analysis. But the speaker is relevant as well—and is
particularly relevant given concerns about failures of
representation. There is some indication that the Roberts Court
may be receptive to this sort of approach in at least some contexts.
In 2012, in an unexplained order, the Court departed from its
94. See Evan Osnos, Embrace the Irony, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), available
at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/embrace-irony.
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preoccupation with listeners in the campaign finance context and
upheld a flat ban on campaign-related spending by foreign
95
persons. Given that foreign spending in American elections
dramatically implicates the rights of listeners, and given that
speakers from particular areas of the world may have things to say
that are of unique value and importance to American citizens who
hail from those areas or may have close relatives still living there,
the Court must have been concerned principally with the
speaker’s side of the First Amendment ledger in upholding the
ban on foreign contributions. While the lack of a written opinion
means that we can only speculate on what various justices may
have had in mind, it’s hard not to suppose that at least some of
those in the Citizens United majority might have been concerned
with distortions of representation: allowing foreign donors to
influence American elections could cause elected officials to be
responsive to those donors rather than to their voting
constituents. Reasoning of this sort could easily be applied to
donations by entities that, like foreign citizens, are not permitted
to vote in American elections—like unions and, of course,
corporations, including transparently ideological nonprofits. It’s
difficult not to recall the moment during the State of the Union
speech in which President Obama, shortly after Citizens United
had been decided, speculated that the decision would mean
possible foreign influence over our elections, only to find Justice
96
Alito visibly but silently mouthing the words “Not true.”
Moreover, the foreign-donors case demonstrates the power of a
minimally theorized approach to campaign finance—we need not
agree on a single, comprehensive theory of representation to
agree that some actions (buying of American elections by foreign
donors) falls outside any plausibly defensible theory.
***
The Supreme Court’s sin in Citizens United is not that it has
been wrong to recognize and embrace the libertarian values that
inhere in the First Amendment. But the libertarian campaign
finance law the Court has developed fails in the broader project
vital to First Amendment jurisprudence: the sensitive
accommodation of competing constitutional values. The Court
has not only underemphasized the egalitarian strain in First
Amendment law—it has rejected that strain outright. And it has
95. See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (mem.) (2012).
96. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation,
N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A12.
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failed to recognize the range of plainly legitimate conceptions of
democracy that Americans hold, instead privileging one view,
democracy-by-financial-contributions, above all others.
How to understand the First Amendment, and deciding how
it should blend libertarian, egalitarian, and democratic values, is
among our most difficult constitutional questions. Yet the Court’s
majority, in its campaign finance jurisprudence, has treated it as
an easy (indeed, almost as a self-answering) question, with one set
of values trumping all others. In so doing, it has reached out to
decide issues not squarely before it while implausibly
downplaying, and at times all but denying, the baleful corruption
of American politics by means short of criminal bribery—by
means that are lamentable precisely because they are lawful.
Faced with weighty normative choices, the wiser path would be
for the Court to answer only the narrow questions it must resolve
to decide the specific controversies presented to it; to be
particularly attentive to empirical realities; and—most of all—to
avoid going “all in” on a single, highly contestable theory of
democracy and on a single, uncompromisingly skeptical,
orientation toward the motives and workings of the political
branches.
There may be satisfaction in such intellectual absolutism, in
painting in bright colors and with a broad brush. But a wiser path
recognizes the difficulty of the normative issues at the heart of
campaign finance law and the irreconcilable values that recent
cases implicate.
This is not a plea for deciding any particular case one way or
another. Indeed, as I stated at the outset, I believe that the Court
rendered the correct judgment in favor of the right claimed by the
corporation that sought to distribute a video critical of Hillary
Clinton in Citizens United. This is instead a plea for greater
judicial open-mindedness, sensitivity to nuance, and a measure of
old-fashioned humility. Just as these issues cannot be intelligently
settled by slogans like “money isn’t speech” and “corporations
aren’t people,” so too they cannot be satisfactorily settled by
proclamations that independent expenditures don’t corrupt or by
sweeping assumptions that government regulation of spending on
political speech always equals censorship. The political branches
should be left with some tools to regulate the alchemy through
which economic inequality perpetuates itself by transmutation
into political and civic inequality. The form that these regulations
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may take is properly policed by the federal judiciary, 97 but Citizens
United appears to represent a much broader and more perilous
assertion of judicial power in campaign finance law and in First
Amendment law more generally: unrelenting skepticism of
legislators’ motives, a pathologically rigid doctrinal absolutism,
and a naïve, unrealistic economic libertarianism and blindness to
political corruption.

97. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 101 (“[I]t would be a mistake to leave
judgments about the ‘proper’ distribution of speech to politicians. Arming them with a
roving license to level the playing field by silencing or adjusting the volume of disfavored
speakers is an invitation to self-serving behavior and, ultimately, tyranny.”).

